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Abstract
Users in various web and mobile applications are vulner-
able to attribute inference attacks, in which an attacker
leverages a machine learning classifier to infer a target
user’s private attributes (e.g., location, sexual orientation,
political view) from its public data (e.g., rating scores,
page likes). Existing defenses leverage game theory or
heuristics based on correlations between the public data
and attributes. These defenses are not practical. Specifi-
cally, game-theoretic defenses require solving intractable
optimization problems, while correlation-based defenses
incur large utility loss of users’ public data.
In this paper, we present AttriGuard, a practical de-
fense against attribute inference attacks. AttriGuard is
computationally tractable and has small utility loss. Our
AttriGuard works in two phases. Suppose we aim to pro-
tect a user’s private attribute. In Phase I, for each value
of the attribute, we find a minimum noise such that if
we add the noise to the user’s public data, then the at-
tacker’s classifier is very likely to infer the attribute value
for the user. We find the minimum noise via adapting
existing evasion attacks in adversarial machine learning.
In Phase II, we sample one attribute value according to
a certain probability distribution and add the correspond-
ing noise found in Phase I to the user’s public data. We
formulate finding the probability distribution as solving
a constrained convex optimization problem. We exten-
sively evaluate AttriGuard and compare it with existing
methods using a real-world dataset. Our results show that
AttriGuard substantially outperforms existing methods.
Our work is the first one that shows evasion attacks can
be used as defensive techniques for privacy protection.
1 Introduction
Attribute inference attacks are emerging threats to user
privacy in various application domains ranging from so-
cial media [1–7] to recommender systems [8, 9] to mo-
bile platforms [10, 11]. In an attribute inference at-
tack, an attacker aims to infer a user’s private attributes
(e.g., location, gender, sexual orientation, and/or polit-
ical view) via leveraging its public data. For instance,
in social media, a user’s public data could be the list of
pages that the user liked on Facebook. Given these page
likes, an attacker can use a machine learning classifier to
accurately infer the user’s various private attributes in-
cluding, but not limited to, gender, sexual orientation,
and political view [3]. Such inferred attributes can be
further leveraged to deliver personalized advertisements
to users [12]. In recommender systems, a user’s public
data could be the list of items (e.g., movies, mobile apps,
videos) that the user rated. Given the rating scores, an
attacker can use a classifier to infer a user’s gender with
an alarming accuracy [9]. Attribute inference attacks can
successfully infer a user’s private attributes via its pub-
lic data because users’ private attributes are statistically
correlated with their public data.
We represent a user’s public data as a vector. For in-
stance, in recommender systems, an entry of the vector
is the rating score the user gave to the corresponding
item or 0 if the user did not rate the item. A defense
against attribute inference attacks essentially adds noise
to a user’s public data vector (i.e., modify certain entries
of the vector) with a goal to decrease the inference accu-
racy of an attacker. One category of defenses (e.g., [13–
16]) against general inference attacks leverage game the-
ory. In these methods, an attacker performs the optimal
inference attack based on the knowledge of the defense,
while the defender defends against the optimal inference
attack. These game-theoretic methods have theoretical
privacy guarantees, i.e., they defend against the optimal
inference attack. However, they are computationally in-
tractable when applied to attribute inference attacks. For
instance, in Appendix A, we extend the game-theoretic
method from Shokri et al. [13] to attribute inference at-
tacks. The computation cost to solve the formulated op-
timization problem is exponential to the dimensionality
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of the public data vector and the public data vector often
has high dimensionality in practice.
To address the computational challenges, several stud-
ies [9, 17–19] proposed to trade theoretical privacy guar-
antees for computational tractability. Specifically, Sala-
matian et al. [19] proposed to quantize the public data
to approximately solve the game-theoretic optimization
problem [16]. Several other methods [9, 17, 18] leverage
correlation-based heuristics, e.g., they modify the public
data entries that have large correlations with the private
attribute values that do not belong to a user. However,
these methods suffer from one or two key limitations.
First, as we will demonstrate in our experiments, they in-
cur large utility loss, i.e., they add a large amount of noise
to a user’s public data. Second, some of them [9, 17, 18]
require the defender to have direct access to a user’s pri-
vate attribute value, in order to compute the correlations
between public data entries and private attribute values
that do not belong to the user. Such requirement in-
troduces usability issue and additional privacy concerns.
Specifically, a user needs to specify its attribute value
to the defender, which makes it inconvenient for users.
Moreover, the defender becomes a single point of fail-
ure, i.e., when the defender is compromised, the private
attribute values of all users are compromised.
To summarize, existing defense methods against at-
tribute inference attacks are not practical. Specifically,
game-theoretic methods are computationally intractable,
while computationally tractable methods incur large util-
ity loss.
Our work: We propose AttriGuard, a practical defense
against attribute inference attacks. AttriGuard is compu-
tationally tractable and incurs small utility loss. In At-
triGuard, the defender’s ultimate goal is to add random
noise to a user’s public data to minimize the attacker’s
inference accuracy with a small utility loss of the pub-
lic data. Achieving this goal relies on estimating the at-
tacker’s accuracy at inferring the user’s private attribute
when a particular noise is added, which is challenging
because 1) the defender does not know the user’s true
attribute value (we consider this threat model to avoid
single-point failure introduced by a compromised de-
fender), and 2) the defender does not know the attacker’s
classifier, since there are many possible choices for the
classifier. To address the challenge, AttriGuard works in
two phases.
In Phase I, for each possible attribute value, the de-
fender finds a minimum noise such that if we add the
noise to the user’s public data, then the attacker’s classi-
fier predicts the attribute value for the user. From the per-
spective of adversarial machine learning [20], finding
such minimum noise is known as evasion attacks to clas-
sifiers. Specifically, in our problem, the defender adds
minimum noise to evade the attacker’s classifier. How-
ever, Phase I faces two challenges. The first challenge
is that existing evasion attack methods [20–25] did not
consider the unique characteristics of privacy protection,
as they were not designed for such purpose. In particular,
in defending against attribute inference attacks, different
users may have different preferences on what types of
noise can be added to their public data. For instance,
in recommender systems, a user may prefer modifying
its existing rating scores, or adding new rating scores
to items the user did not rate before, or combination of
them. Existing evasion attack methods did not consider
such constraints. To address the challenge, we optimize
an existing evasion attack, which was developed by Pa-
pernot et al. [23], to incorporate such constraints.
The second challenge is that the defender does not
know the attacker’s classifier. To address the challenge,
the defender itself learns a classifier to perform attribute
inference. Since both the attacker’s classifier and the de-
fender’s classifier model the relationships between users’
public data and private attributes and the two classifiers
could have similar classification boundaries, the noise
optimized to evade the defender’s classifier is very likely
to also evade the attacker’s classifier. Such phenomenon
is known as transferability [22, 26, 27] in adversarial ma-
chine learning. Evasion attacks are often viewed as of-
fensive techniques. For the first time, our work shows
that evasion attacks can also be used as defensive tech-
niques. In particular, evasion attacks can play an impor-
tant role at defending against attribute inference attacks.
In Phase II, the defender randomly picks an attribute
value according to a probability distribution q over the
possible attribute values and adds the corresponding
noise found in Phase I to the user’s public data. The prob-
ability distribution q roughly characterizes the probabil-
ity distribution of the attacker’s inference for the user.
We find the probability distribution q via minimizing
its distance to a target probability distribution p with a
bounded utility loss of the public data. The target prob-
ability distribution is selected by the defender. For in-
stance, the target probability distribution could be a uni-
form distribution over the possible attribute values, with
which the defender aims to make the attacker’s inference
close to random guessing. Formally, we formulate find-
ing the probability distribution q as solving a constrained
convex optimization problem. Moreover, we develop a
method based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions [28] to solve the optimization problem.
We evaluate AttriGuard and compare it with exist-
ing defenses using a real-world dataset from Gong and
Liu [5]. In the dataset, a user’s public data are the rat-
ing scores the user gave to mobile apps on Google Play,
while the attribute is the city a user lives/lived in. First,
our results demonstrate that our adapted evasion attack in
Phase I outperforms existing ones. Second, AttriGuard is
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effective at defending against attribute inference attacks.
For instance, by modifying at most 4 rating scores on
average, the attacker’s inference accuracy is reduced by
75% for several defense-unaware attribute inference at-
tacks and attacks that adapt to our defense. Third, At-
triGuard adds significantly smaller noise to users’ public
data than existing defenses when reducing the attacker’s
inference accuracy by the same amount.
In summary, our key contributions are as follows:
• We propose AttriGuard, a practical two-phase defense
against attribute inference attacks.
• We optimize an evasion attack method to incorpo-
rate the unique characteristics of defending against
attribute inference attacks in Phase I of AttriGuard.
Moreover, we develop a KKT condition based solu-
tion to select the random noise in Phase II.
• We extensively evaluate AttriGuard and compare it
with existing defenses using a real-world dataset.
2 Related Work
2.1 Attribute Inference Attacks
A number of recent studies [1–11, 29–32] have demon-
strated that users are vulnerable to attribute inference at-
tacks. In these attacks, an attacker has access to a set of
measurement data about a target user, which we call pub-
lic data; and the attacker aims to infer private attributes
(e.g., location, political view, or sexual orientation) of
the target user. Specifically, the attacker has a machine
learning classifier, which takes a user’s public data as in-
put and produces the user’s attribute value. The classifier
can be learnt on a training dataset consisting of both pub-
lic data and attribute values of users who also make their
attributes public. Next, we review several attribute infer-
ence attacks in various application domains.
In recommender systems, a user’s public data can be
the list of rating scores that the user gave to certain items.
Weinsberg et al. [9] demonstrated that an attacker (e.g.,
provider of a recommender system) can use a machine
learning classifier (e.g., logistic regression) to predict a
user’s gender based on the user’s rating scores to movies.
Specifically, an attacker first collects rating scores and
gender information from the users who publicly disclose
both rating scores and gender; the attacker represents
each user’s rating scores as a feature vector, e.g., the ith
entry of the feature vector is the rating score that the user
gave to the ith movie if the user reviewed the ith movie,
otherwise the ith entry is 0; and the attacker uses the col-
lected data as a training dataset to learn a classifier to
map a user’s rating scores to gender. The attacker then
uses the classifier to infer gender for target users who do
not disclose their gender, i.e., given a target user’s rating
scores, the classifier produces either male or female.
In social media (e.g., Facebook), a user’s public data
could be the list of pages or musics liked or shared by
the user, as well as the user’s friend lists. Several stud-
ies [1–7] have demonstrated that an attacker (e.g., social
media provider, advertiser, or data broker) can use a ma-
chine learning classifier to infer a target user’s private
attributes (e.g., gender, cities lived, and political view)
based on the user’s public data on social media. Again,
the attacker first collects a dataset from users who dis-
close their attributes and use them as a training dataset
to learn the classifier. The classifier is then used to infer
attributes of target users who do not disclose them.
In mobile apps, Michalevsky et al. [10] showed that an
attacker can use machine learning to infer a user’s loca-
tion based on the user’s smartphone’s aggregate power
consumption (i.e., “public data” in our terminology).
Narain et al. [11] showed that an attacker can infer user
locations using the gyroscope, accelerometer, and mag-
netometer data available from the user’s smartphone.
In side-channel attacks [31, 32], an attacker could use
power consumption and processing time (i.e., public
data) to infer cryptographic keys (i.e., private attribute).
2.2 Defenses
Game-theoretic methods: Shokri et al. [13] proposed a
game-theoretic method to defend against location infer-
ence attacks; the attacker performs the optimal inference
attack that the attacker adapts to the defense; and the de-
fender obfuscates the locations to protect users against
the optimal inference attack. Calmon et al. [16] proposed
a game-theoretic method to defend against attribute in-
ference attacks. These methods have theoretical privacy
guarantees, but they rely on optimization problems that
are computationally intractable when applied to attribute
inference attacks. Note that the method proposed by
Shokri et al. [13] is tractable for defending against loca-
tion inference attacks, because such problem essentially
has a public data vector of 1 dimension.
Computationally tractable methods: Due to the com-
putational challenges of the game-theoretic methods,
several studies [9, 17–19] proposed to develop tractable
methods, with the degradation of theoretical privacy
guarantees. For instance, Salamatian et al. [19] pro-
posed Quantization Probabilistic Mapping (QPM) to ap-
proximately solve the game-theoretic optimization prob-
lem formulated by Calmon et al. [16]. Specifically, they
cluster users’ public data and use the cluster centroids
to represent them. Then, they approximately solve the
optimization problem using the cluster centroids. Since
quantization is used, QPM has no theoretical privacy
guarantee, i.e., QPM does not necessarily defend against
the optimal attribute inference attacks, but QPM makes
it tractable to solve the defense problem in practice.
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Other computationally tractable methods [9, 18] lever-
aged heuristic correlations between the entries of the
public data vector and attribute values. Specifically, they
modify the k entries that have large correlations with the
attribute values that do not belong to the target user. k is
a parameter to control privacy-utility tradeoffs. For in-
stance, Weinsberg et al. [9] proposed BlurMe to defend
against attribute inference attacks in the context of rec-
ommender systems. For each attribute value i, they or-
der the items into a list Li according to the correlations
between the items and the attribute values other than i.
Specifically, for each attribute value i, they learn a logis-
tic regression classifier via using the public data vector as
a feature vector; and the negative coefficient of an item
in the logistic regression classifier is treated as its corre-
lation with the attribute values other than i. An item has
a larger correlation means that changing the item’s rating
score is more likely to change the classifier’s inference.
For a target user whose attribute value is i, the defender
selects the top-k items from the list Li that were not rated
by the user yet, and then adds the average rating score to
those items. Chen et al. [18] proposed ChiSquare, which
computed correlations between items and attribute val-
ues based on chi-square statistics.
As we elaborated in the Introduction section, these
methods have one or two limitations: 1) they incur large
utility loss, and 2) some of them require the defender to
have direct access to users’ private attribute values.
Local differential privacy (LDP): LDP [33–40] is a
technique based on ε-differential privacy [41] to protect
privacy of an individual user’s data record, i.e., public
data in our problem. LDP provides a strong privacy guar-
antee. However, LDP aims to achieve a privacy goal that
is different from the one in attribute inference attacks.
Roughly speaking, LDP’s privacy goal is to add random
noise to a user’s true data record such that two arbitrary
true data records have close probabilities (their differ-
ence is bounded by a privacy budget) to generate the
same noisy data record. However, in defending against
attribute inference attacks, the privacy goal is to add
noise to a user’s public data record such that the user’s
private attributes cannot be accurately inferred by the at-
tacker’s classifier. As a result, as we will demonstrate
in our experiments, LDP achieves a suboptimal privacy-
utility tradeoff at defending against attribute inference at-
tacks, i.e., LDP adds much larger noise than our defense
to make the attacker have the same inference accuracy.
3 Problem Formulation
We have three parties: user, attacker, and defender. The
defender adds noise to a user’s public data to protect its
private attribute. Next, we discuss each party one by one.
3.1 User
A user aims to publish some data while preventing in-
ference of its private attribute from the public data. We
denote the user’s public data and private attribute as
x (a column vector) and s, respectively. For simplic-
ity, we assume each entry of x is normalized to be in
the range [0,1]. The attribute s has m possible values,
which we denote as {1,2, · · · ,m}; s = i means that the
user’s private attribute value is i. For instance, when
the private attribute is political view, the attribute could
have two possible values, i.e., democratic and republi-
can. We note that the attribute s could be a combination
of multiple attributes. For instance, the attribute could be
s= (political view, gender), which has four possible val-
ues, i.e., (democratic, male), (republican, male), (demo-
cratic, female), and (republican, female).
Policy to add noise: Different users may have differ-
ent preferences over what kind of noise can be added to
their public data. For instance, in recommender systems,
a user may prefer modifying its existing rating scores,
while another user may prefer adding new rating scores.
We call a policy specifying what kind of noise can be
added a noise-type-policy. In particular, we consider the
following three types of noise-type-policy.
• Policy A: Modify Exist. In this policy, the defender
can only modify the non-zero entries of x. In recom-
mender systems, this policy means that the defender
can only modify a user’s existing rating scores; in so-
cial media, when the public data correspond to page
likes, this policy means that the defender can only re-
move a user’s existing page likes.
• Policy B: Add New. In this policy, the defender can
only change the zero entries of x. In recommender
systems, this policy means that the defender can only
add new rating scores for a user; when the public data
represent page likes in social media, this policy means
that the defender can only add new page likes for a
user. We call this policy Add New.
• Policy C: Modify Add. This policy is a combination
of Modify Exist and Add New. In particular, the de-
fender could modify any entry of x.
3.2 Attacker
The attacker has access to the noisy public data and aims
to infer the user’s private attribute value. We consider
an attacker has a machine learning classifier that takes a
user’s (noisy) public data as input and infers the user’s
private attribute value. Different users might treat differ-
ent attributes as private. In particular, some users do not
treat the attribute s as private, so they publicly disclose
it. Via collecting data from such users, the attacker can
learn the machine learning classifier.
4
We denote the attacker’s machine learning classifier
as Ca, and Ca(x)∈ {1,2, · · · ,m} is the predicted attribute
value for the user whose public data is x. The attacker
could use a standard machine learning classifier, e.g.,
logistic regression, random forest, and neural network.
Moreover, an attacker can also adapt its attack based on
the defense. For instance, the attacker could first try de-
tecting the noise and then perform attribute inference at-
tacks. We assume the attacker’s classifier is unknown to
the defender, since there are many possible choices for
the attacker’s classifier.
3.3 Defender
The defender adds noise to a user’s true public data ac-
cording to a noise-type-policy. The defender is a soft-
ware on the user’s client side. For instance, to defend
against attribute inference attacks on a social media, the
defender can be an app within the social media or a
browser extension. Once a user gives privileges to the
defender, the defender can modify its public data, e.g.,
the defender can add page likes on Facebook or rate new
items in a recommender system on behalf of the user.
The defender has access to the user’s true public data
x. The defender adds a random noise vector r to x, and
the noise is randomly selected according to a random-
ized noise addition mechanismM . Formally,M (r|x) is
the probability that the defender will add noise vector r
when the true public data is x. Since the defender adds
random noise to the user’s public data, the resulting noisy
public data x+ r is a randomized vector. Therefore, the
inference of the attacker’s classifier Ca is also a random
variable. We denote the probability distribution of this
random variable as q, where qi = Pr(Ca(x+ r) = i) is the
probability that the classifier Ca outputs i.
The defender’s ultimate goal is to find a mechanism
M that minimizes the inference accuracy of the at-
tacker’s classifier with a bounded utility loss of the pub-
lic data. However, the defender faces two challenges
at computing such inference accuracy: 1) the defender
does not know the attacker’s classifier Ca, and 2) the
defender has no access to a user’s true private attribute
value. Specifically, in our threat model, to avoid single-
point failure introduced by a compromised defender, we
consider the defender does not have direct access to the
user’s private attribute value.
Addressing the first challenge: To address the first
challenge, the defender itself learns a classifier C to per-
form attribute inference. For instance, using the data
from the users who share both public data and attribute
values, the defender can learn such a classifier C. The
defender treats the output probability distribution of the
classifier C as the output probability distribution q of
the attacker’s classifier. Moreover, we consider the de-
fender’s classifier C is implemented in the popular one-
vs-all paradigm. Specifically, the classifier has m deci-
sion functions denoted as C1, C2, · · · , Cm, where Ci(x)
is the confidence that the user has an attribute value
i. The classifier’s inferred attribute value is C(x) =
argmaxi Ci(x). Note that, when the attribute only has two
possible values (i.e., m = 2), we have C2(x) = −C1(x)
for classifiers like logistic regression and SVM.
Addressing the second challenge: To address the sec-
ond challenge, we consider an alternative goal, which
aims to find a mechanismM such that the output prob-
ability distribution q is the closest to a target probability
distribution p with a utility-loss budget, where p is se-
lected by the defender. For instance, without knowing
anything about the attributes, the target probability dis-
tribution could be the uniform distribution over the m at-
tribute values, with which the defender aims to make the
attacker’s inference close to random guessing. The tar-
get probability distribution could also be estimated from
the users who publicly disclose the attribute, e.g., the
probability pi is the fraction of such users who have at-
tribute value i. Such target probability distribution natu-
rally represents a baseline attribute inference attack. The
defender aims to reduce an attack to the baseline attack
with such target probability distribution.
The defender needs a formal metric to quantify the dis-
tance between p and q such that the defender can find
a mechanism M to minimize the distance. We mea-
sure the distance between p and q using their Kullback–
Leibler (KL) divergence, i.e., KL(p||q)=∑i pilog piqi . We
choose KL divergence because it makes our formulated
optimization problem become a convex problem, which
has efficient and accurate solutions.
Measuring utility loss: A user’s (noisy) public data are
often leveraged by a service provider to provide services.
For instance, in a recommender system (e.g., Amazon,
Google Play, Netflix), a user’s public data are rating
scores or likes/dislikes to items, which are used to recom-
mend items to users that match their personalized pref-
erences. Therefore, utility loss of the public data can es-
sentially be measured by the service quality loss. Specif-
ically, in a recommender system, the decreased accuracy
of the recommendations introduced by the added noise
can be used as utility loss. However, using such service-
dependent utility loss makes the formulated optimization
problem computationally intractable.
Therefore, we aim to use utility-loss metrics that make
our formulated optimization problems tractable but can
still well approximate the utility loss for different ser-
vices. In particular, we can use a distance metric d(x,x+
r) to measure utility loss. Since r is a random value gen-
erated according to the mechanismM , we will measure
the utility loss using the expected distance E(d(x,x+r)).
For instance, the distance metric can be L0 norm of the
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noise, i.e., d(x,x+ r) = ||r||0. L0 norm is the number
of entries of x that are modified by the noise, which has
semantic interpretations in a number of real-world appli-
cation domains. For instance, in a recommender system,
L0 norm means the number of items whose rating scores
are modified. Likewise, in social media, an entry of x
is 1 if the user liked the corresponding page, otherwise
the entry is 0. Then, L0 norm means the number of page
likes that are removed or added by the defender. The
distance metric can also be L2 norm of the noise, which
considers the magnitude of the modified rating scores in
the context of recommender systems.
Attribute-inference-attack defense problem: With a
quantifiable defender’s goal and utility loss, we can for-
mally define the problem of defending against attribute
inference attacks. Specifically, the user specifies a noise-
type-policy and an utility-loss budget β . The defender
specifies a target probability distribution p, learns a clas-
sifier C, and finds a mechanism M ∗, which adds noise
to the user’s public data such that the user’s utility loss
is within the budget while the output probability distribu-
tion q of the classifier C is closest to the target probability
distribution p. Formally, we have:
Definition 1 Given a noise-type-policy P , an utility-
loss budget β , a target probability distribution p, and a
classifier C, the defender aims to find a mechanismM ∗
via solving the following optimization problem:
M ∗ =argmin
M
KL(p||q)
subject to E(d(x,x+ r))≤ β , (1)
where the probability distribution q depends on the clas-
sifier C and the mechanismM .
In this work, we use the L0 norm of the noise as the
metric d(x,x+ r) because of its semantic interpretation.
4 Design of AttriGuard
4.1 Overview
The major challenge to solve the optimization problem in
Equation 1 is that the number of parameters of the mech-
anism M , which maps a given vector to another vector
probabilistically, is exponential to the dimensionality of
the public data vector. To address the challenge, we pro-
pose a two-phase framework to solve the optimization
problem. Our intuition is that, although the noise space
is large, we can categorize them into m groups depending
on the defender’s classifier’s inference. Specifically, we
denote by Gi the group of noise such that if we add any of
them to the user’s public data, then the defender’s classi-
fier will infer the attribute value i for the user. Essentially,
the probability qi that the defender’s classifier infers at-
tribute value i for the user is the probability thatM will
produce a noise in the group Gi, i.e., qi =∑r∈GiM (r|x).
AttriGuard finds one representative noise in each group
and assumesM is a probability distribution concentrated
on the representative noise.
Specifically, in Phase I, for each group Gi, we find a
minimum noise ri such that if we add ri to the user’s
public data, then the defender’s classifier predicts the at-
tribute value i for the user. We find a minimum noise
in order to minimize utility loss. In adversarial machine
learning, this is known as evasion attack. However, ex-
isting evasion attack methods [20–25] are insufficient to
find the noise ri in our problem, because they do not con-
sider the noise-type-policy. We optimize an existing eva-
sion attack method developed by Papernot et al. [23] to
incorporate noise-type-policy. The noise ri optimized to
evade the defender’s classifier is also very likely to make
the attacker’s classifier predict the attribute value i for
the user, which is known as transferability [22, 26, 27] in
adversarial machine learning.
In Phase II, we simplify the mechanism M ∗ to be a
probability distribution over the m representative noise
{r1,r2, · · · ,rm}. In other words, the defender randomly
samples a noise ri according to the probability distribu-
tion M ∗ and adds the noise to the user’s public data.
Under such simplification,M ∗ only has at most m non-
zero parameters, the output probability distribution q of
the defender’s classifier essentially becomesM ∗, and we
can transform the optimization problem in Equation 1 to
be a convex problem. Moreover, we design a method
based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [28]
to solve the convex optimization problem.
4.2 Phase I: Finding ri
The user’s public data is x. Suppose we aim to add a min-
imum noise ri to x, according to the noise-type-policy
P , such that the classifier C infers the attribute value i
for the user. Formally, we model finding such ri as solv-
ing the following optimization problem:
ri = argmin
r
||r||0
subject to C(x+ r) = i. (2)
Our formulation of finding ri is closely related to
adversarial machine learning. In particular, finding ri
can be viewed as an evasion attack [20–25] to the clas-
sifier C. However, existing evasion attack algorithms
(e.g., [22, 23, 25]) are insufficient to solve ri in our prob-
lem. The key reason is that they do not consider the
noise-type-policy, which specifies the types of noise that
can be added. We note that evasion attacks to machine
learning are generally treated as offensive techniques, but
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Algorithm 1 Policy-Aware Noise Finding Algorithm
Input: Public data x, classifier C, noise-type-policyP ,
target attribute value i, and step size τ .
Output: Noise ri.
Initialize t = 0,x = x.
1: while C(x) 6= i and t ≤maxiter do
2: //Find the entry to be modified.
3: ifP == Add New then
4: einc = argmax j{ ∂Ci(x)∂x j |x j = 0}
5: end if
6: ifP == Modi f y Exist then
7: einc = argmax j{(1−x j) ∂Ci(x)∂x j |x j 6= 0}
8: edec = argmax j{−x j ∂Ci(x)∂x j |x j 6= 0}
9: end if
10: ifP == Modi f y Add then
11: einc = argmax j{(1−x j) ∂Ci(x)∂x j }
12: edec = argmax j{−x j ∂Ci(x)∂x j }
13: end if
14: //Modify the entry xeinc or xedec depending on
which one is more beneficial.
15: vinc = (1−xeinc) ∂Ci(x)∂xeinc
16: vdec =−xedec ∂Ci(x)∂xedec
17: ifP == Add New or vinc ≥ vdec then
18: xeinc = clip(xeinc + τ)
19: else
20: xedec = clip(xedec − τ)
21: end if
22: t = t+1
23: end while
24: return x−x.
our work demonstrates that evasion attacks can also be
used as defensive techniques, e.g., defending against at-
tribute inference attacks.
Papernot et al. [23] proposed a Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) to deep neural networks.
They demonstrated that JSMA can find small noise (mea-
sured by L0 norm) to evade a deep neural network. Their
algorithm iteratively adds noise to an example (x in our
case) until the classifier C predicts i as its label or the
maximum number of iterations is reached. In each itera-
tion, the algorithm picks one or two entries of x based on
saliency map, and then increase or decrease the entries
by a constant value.
We also design our algorithm based on saliency map.
However, our algorithm is different from JSMA in two
aspects. First, our algorithm incorporates the noise-type-
policy, while theirs does not. The major reason is that
their algorithm is not developed for preserving privacy,
so they do not have noise-type-policy as an input. Sec-
ond, in their algorithm, all the modified entries of x are
either increased or decreased. In our algorithm, some
entries can be increased while other entries can be de-
creased. As we will demonstrate in our experiments, our
algorithm can find smaller noise than JSMA.
Algorithm 1 shows our algorithm to find ri. We call
our algorithm Policy-Aware Noise Finding Algorithm
(PANDA). Roughly speaking, in each iteration, based on
the noise-type-policy and saliency map, we find the entry
of x, by increasing or decreasing which the noisy public
data could most likely move towards the class i. Then,
we modify the entry by τ , which is a parameter in our
algorithm. We will discuss setting τ in our experiments.
The operation clip(y) at lines 18 and 20 normalizes the
value y to be in [0,1], i.e., clip(y)= 1 if y> 1, clip(y)= 0
if y < 0, and clip(y) = y otherwise. We note that, for
the noise-type-policy Modify Add, our algorithm can al-
ways find a solution ri, because this policy allows us to
explore each possible public data vector. However, for
the policies Modify Exist and Add New, there might ex-
ist no solution ri for the optimization problem in Equa-
tion 2. In such cases, we will automatically extend to the
Modify Add policy.
4.3 Phase II: FindingM ∗
In AttriGuard, after the defender solves {r1,r2, · · · ,rm},
the defender randomly samples one of them with a cer-
tain probability and adds it to the user’s public data x.
Therefore, in our framework, the randomized noise ad-
dition mechanism M is a probability distribution over
{r1,r2, · · · ,rm}, whereMi is the probability that the de-
fender adds ri to x. Since qi = Pr(C(x+ r) = i) and
C(x+ ri) = i, we have qi =Mi, where i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}.
Therefore, we can transform the optimization problem in
Equation 1 to the following optimization problem:
M ∗ =argmin
M
KL(p||M )
subject to
m
∑
i=1
Mi||ri||0 ≤ β
Mi > 0,∀i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}
m
∑
i=1
Mi = 1, (3)
where we use the L0 norm of the noise as the utility-loss
metric d(x,x+ r) in Equation 1.
Next, we discuss how to solve the above optimization
problem. We can show that the above optimization prob-
lem is convex because its objective function and con-
straints are convex, which implies that M ∗ is a global
minimum. Therefore, according to the standard Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [28], we have the follow-
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ing equations:
OM (KL(p||M ∗)+µ0(
m
∑
i=1
M ∗i ||ri||0−β )−
m
∑
i=1
µiM ∗i
+λ (
m
∑
i=1
M ∗i −1)) = 0 (4)
µiM ∗i = 0,∀i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m} (5)
µ0(
m
∑
i=1
M ∗i ||ri||0−β ) = 0, (6)
whereO indicates gradient, while µi and λ are KKT mul-
tipliers. Then, we can obtain the following equations:
µi = 0,∀i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m} (7)
M ∗i =
pi
µ0||ri||0+λ (8)
m
∑
i=1
M ∗i ||ri||0−β = 0 (9)
µ0 =
1−λ
β
. (10)
We briefly explain how we obtain Equations 7-10 from
the KKT conditions. First, according to Equation 5 and
M ∗i > 0, we have Equation 7. Then, according to Equa-
tion 4 and Equation 7, we have Equation 8. Moreover,
we have Equation 9 from Equation 6 since µ0 6= 0. Fi-
nally, since ∑mi=1M ∗i = 1, we further have Equation 10
from Equation 8 and Equation 9.
Via substituting M ∗i in Equation 9 with Equation 8
and Equation 10, we obtain a nonlinear equation with a
single variable λ . We can use the Newton’s method to
solve λ , and then we can obtain µ0 in Equation 10 and
M ∗ from Equation 8.
Interpreting our mechanism M ∗: If we do not
have the utility-loss constraint ∑mi=1Mi||ri||0 ≤ β in the
optimization problem in Equation 3, then the mech-
anism M ∗ = p reaches the minimum KL divergence
KL(p||M ), where p is the target probability distribution
selected by the defender. In other words, if we do not
consider utility loss, the defender samples the noise ri
with the target probability pi and adds it to the user’s pub-
lic data. However, when we consider the utility-loss bud-
get, the relationship between the mechanismM ∗ and the
target probability distribution p is represented in Equa-
tion 8. In other words, the defender samples the noise ri
with a probability that is the target probability pi normal-
ized by the magnitude of the noise ri.
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Figure 1: Fraction of users who live/lived in a city.
5 Evaluations
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Dataset
We obtained a review dataset from Gong and Liu [5].
The public data of a user are the Google Play apps the
user rated. We selected 10,000 popular apps and kept the
users who reviewed at least 10 apps. In total, we have
16,238 users, and each user rated 23.2 apps on average.
We represent a user’s public data as a 10,000-dimension
vector x, where each entry corresponds to an app. If the
user rated an app, the corresponding entry is the rating
score (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5), otherwise the corresponding
entry has a value of 0. The attribute is the city a user
lives/lived in, which were collected from users’ Google+
profiles and obtained from Gong et al. [42]. In total, we
consider 25 popular cities. Figure 1 shows the fraction
of users that live/lived in a particular city. Note that we
normalize each entry of a user’s public data vector (i.e.,
review data vector) to be in [0,1], i.e., each entry is 0,
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0.
Training and testing: We sample 90% of the users in
the dataset uniformly at random and assume that they
publicly disclose their cities lived, e.g., on Google+. The
app review data and lived cities of these users are called
training dataset. The remaining users do not disclose
their cities lived, and we call them testing dataset.
5.1.2 Attribute Inference Attacks
An attribute inference attack aims to infer the cities lived
for the testing users. Specifically, an attacker learns a
multi-class classifier, which takes a review data vector
as an input and infers the city lived, using the training
dataset. We evaluate an attack using the inference accu-
racy of the classifier used by the attack. Formally, the
inference accuracy of a classifier is the fraction of test-
ing users that the inferred city lived is correct. Since the
defender does not know the attacker’s classifier, we eval-
uate the effectiveness of AttriGuard against various at-
tribute inference attacks as follows (we use a suffix “-A”
to indicate the classifiers are used by the attacker):
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Baseline attack (BA-A): In this baseline attack, the at-
tacker computes the most popular city among the users in
the training dataset. The attacker predicts the most pop-
ular city for every user in the testing dataset. The infer-
ence accuracy of this baseline attack will not be changed
by defenses that add noise to the testing users.
Logistic regression (LR-A): In this attack, the attacker
uses a multi-class logistic regression classifier to perform
attribute inference attacks. The LR classifier was also
used by previous attribute inference attacks [3, 5, 6, 9].
Random forest (RF-A): In this attack, the attacker uses
a random forest classifier to perform attacks.
Neural network (NN-A): We consider the attacker uses
a three-layer (i.e., input layer, hidden layer, and output
layer) fully connected neural network to perform attacks.
The hidden layer has 30,000 neurons. The output layer is
a softmax layer. We adopt the rectified linear units as the
activation function for neurons as it was demonstrated to
outperform other activation functions [43]. Note that the
three-layer NN-A classifier might not be the best neural
network classifier for inferring the city lived. However,
exploring the best NN-A is not the focus of our work.
Robust classifiers: adversarial training (AT-A), de-
fensive distillation (DD-A), and region-based classi-
fication (RC-A): Since our defense AttriGuard lever-
ages evasion attacks to find the noise, an attacker could
leverage classifiers that are more robust to evasion at-
tacks, based on the knowledge of our defense. We con-
sider robust classifiers based on adversarial training [22],
defensive distillation [44], and region-based classifica-
tion [45]. In adversarial training, an attacker generates
noise for each user in the training dataset using Attri-
Guard and learns the neural network classifier NN-A us-
ing the noisy training dataset. In defensive distillation,
an attacker refines its neural network classifier NN-A us-
ing soft labels. In region-based classification, for each
testing user with a certain review data vector, an attacker
randomly samples n data points from a hypercube cen-
tered at the review data vector; applies the NN-A classi-
fier to predict the attribute for each sampled data point;
and the attacker takes a majority vote among the sampled
data points to infer the user’s attribute. We set n = 100.
Detecting noise via low-rank approximation (LRA-
A): An attacker could detect noise, remove the noise,
and then perform attribute inference attacks. Whether
the noise added by AttriGuard can be detected by an at-
tacker and how to detect it effectively are not the focuses
of this work, though we believe they are interesting fu-
ture works. In this work, we try one way of detecting
noise. An attacker essentially obtains a matrix of (noisy)
public data for users, where each row corresponds to a
user. Each entry of the matrix is a rating score or 0 if
the corresponding user did not rate the item. It was well
Table 1: Inference accuracy of different attribute in-
ference attacks when no defense is used.
Attack Inference Accuracy
BA-A 0.10
LR-A 0.43
RF-A 0.44
NN-A 0.39
AT-A 0.39
DD-A 0.40
RC-A 0.38
LRA-A 0.27
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Figure 2: Inference accuracy vs. radius of the hyper-
cube for RC-A.
known that, in recommender systems, a normal rating-
score matrix can be explained by a small number of latent
factors. Therefore, an attacker could perform a low-rank
approximation (LRA) of the matrix. After low-rank ap-
proximation, each row could be viewed as the de-noised
rating scores of a user. Then, the attacker uses these de-
noised rating scores to learn a classifier NN-A and uses
it to perform attribute inference. We implemented LRA
using non-negative matrix factorization with a rank 500.
The attacks BA-A, LR-A, RF-A, and NN-A are un-
aware of the defense, while AT-A, DD-A, RC-A, and
LRA-A are attacks that adapt to defense. Table 1 shows
the inference accuracy of each attack for the testing users
when no defense is used. We note that RC-A’s infer-
ence accuracy depends on the radius of the hypercube.
Figure 2 shows the inference accuracy as a function of
the radius for RC-A. After 0.05, the inference accuracy
drops sharply. Therefore, we set the radius to be 0.05 in
our experiments (we use a relatively large radius to be
more robust to noise added to the review data vectors).
Without otherwise mentioned, we assume the attacker
uses NN-A because it is harder for the defender to guess
the neural network setting. Gong and Liu [5] proposed
an attribute inference attack. However, their attack re-
quires both social friends and behavior data. Since our
work focuses on attribute inference attacks that only use
behavior data (i.e., app review data in our experiments),
we do not compare with their attack.
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Figure 3: Average noise for each city. The defender’s classifier is (a) LR-D and (b) NN-D, respectively.
5.1.3 Parameter Setting in AttriGuard
The defender aims to leverage our AttriGuard to protect
the cities lived for the testing users.
Target probability distribution p: We consider two
possible target probability distributions.
• Uniform probability distribution pu. Without any
information about the cities lived, the target probabil-
ity distribution (denoted as pu) could be the uniform
probability distribution over the 25 cities, with which
the defender aims to minimize the difference between
an attacker’s inference and random guessing subject
to a utility-loss budget.
• Training-dataset-based pt . When the defender has
access to the data of some users (e.g., users in the
training dataset) who publicly disclose their cities, the
defender can estimate the target probability distribu-
tion (denoted as pt ) from such data. Specifically, the
target probability for city i is the fraction of training
users who have city i. With such target probability
distribution, the defender aims to minimize the differ-
ence between an attacker’s inference and the baseline
attack BA-A.
Without otherwise mentioned, we assume the defender
uses the second target probability distribution pt since it
considers certain knowledge about the attributes.
Defender’s classifier C (LR-D and NN-D): We con-
sider two choices for the defender’s classifier, i.e., multi-
class logistic regression (LR-D) and neural network
(NN-D). To distinguish between the classifiers used by
the attacker and those used by the defender, we use a
suffix “-A” for each attacker’s classifier while we use a
suffix “-D” for a defender’s classifier. We note that the
defender could choose any differentiable classifier. We
require differentiable classifiers because our evasion at-
tack algorithm PANDA in Phase I is applicable to differ-
entiable classifiers. For the NN-D classifier, we also con-
sider a three-layer fully connected neural network. How-
Table 2: Average success rates and running times.
Method Success Rate Running Time (s)LR-D NN-D LR-D NN-D
FGSM 100% 100% 7.6 84
JSMA 100% 100% 9.0 295
CW 75% 71% 7,406 1,067,610
PANDA 100% 100% 8.7 272
ever, unlike NN-A that is used by the attacker, we as-
sume the hidden layer of the NN-D classifier has 50,000
neurons. Without otherwise mentioned, we assume the
defender uses the LR-D classifier and learns it using the
training dataset. We adopt LR-D as the default classi-
fier because it is much more efficient to generate noise in
Phase I. We will study the effectiveness of our defense
when the attacker and the defender use different dataset
to learn their classifiers.
Other parameters: We set τ in our algorithm PANDA
to be 1.0 when finding the minimum noise. Without
otherwise mentioned, we set the noise-type-policy to be
Modify Add.
5.2 Results
Comparing PANDA with existing evasion attack
methods: We compare PANDA with the following eva-
sion attack methods at finding the noise ri in Phase I: Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [22], Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [23], and Carlini and Wag-
ner Attack (CW) [25]. We leveraged the open-source im-
plementation of CW published by its authors. The CW
attack has three variants that are optimized to find small
noise measured by L0, L2, and L∞ norms, respectively.
We use the one that optimizes L0 norm. We focus on the
noise-type-policy Modify Add, because FGSM, JSMA,
and CW are not applicable to other policies. Note that
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Figure 4: Attacker’s inference accuracy vs. utility-
loss budget.
after a method produces a noise ri, we will round each
entry to be 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0 since our noisy
public data are discrete rating scores, and the rounded ri
is treated as the final noise.
Figure 3 shows their noise (measured by L0 norm) av-
eraged over test users for each city. Moreover, Table 2
shows the success rate and running time averaged over
test users for each compared method. For each method,
a test user’s success rate is the fraction of cities for which
the method can successfully find a ri to make the classi-
fier infer the ith city for the test user, and a test user’s
running time is the time required for the method to find
ri for all cities. We set the step size parameter ε in FGSM
to be 1 as we aim to achieve a high success rate. Note that
the value of ε does not impact the L0 norm of the noise
generated by FGSM.
First, FGSM adds orders of magnitude larger noise
than other methods. This is because FGSM aims to
minimize noise with respect to L∞ norm instead of L0
norm. Second, PANDA adds smaller noise and is slightly
faster than JSMA for both LR-D and NN-D classifiers.
This is because PANDA allows more flexible noise, i.e.,
some entries can be increased while other entries can
be decreased in PANDA, while all modified entries can
either be increased or decreased in JSMA. PANDA is
faster than JSMA because it adds smaller noise and
thus it runs for less iterations. Third, PANDA adds
no larger noise than CW for the LR-D classifier; and
PANDA adds smaller noise for some cities, but larger
noise for other cities for the NN-D classifier. However,
CW only has success rates less than 80%, because of
rounding the noise to be consistent with rating scores.
Moreover, PANDA is around 800 times and 4,000 times
faster than CW for the LR-D and NN-D classifiers, re-
spectively. Considering the tradeoffs between the added
noise, success rate, and running time, we recommend to
use PANDA for finding noise in Phase I of AttriGuard.
We note that JSMA and CW have similar noise for
the LR-D classifier, and CW even has larger noise than
JSMA for certain cities for the NN-D classifier. Carlini
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Figure 5: Impact of the target probability distribu-
tion. The attack is NN-A and the defender uses LR-D.
and Wagner [25] found that CW outperforms JSMA. We
suspect the reason is that our results are on review data,
while their results are about image data.
Effectiveness of AttriGuard: Figure 4 shows the infer-
ence accuracy of various attribute inference attacks as the
utility-loss budget increases, where the defender’s classi-
fier is LR-D. AttriGuard is effective at defending against
attribute inference attacks. For instance, when modify-
ing 3-4 rating scores on average, several attacks become
less effective than the baseline attack. The inference
accuracy of LR-A decreases the fastest as the utility-
loss budget increases. This is because the defender uses
LR-D, and the noise optimized based on LR-D is more
likely to transfer to LR-A. The adversarial training attack
AT-A has almost the same inference accuracy as NN-A.
The reason is that adversarial training is not robust to
iterative evasion attack [46] and PANDA is an iterative
evasion attack. Defensive distillation attack DD-A has
slightly higher inference accuracies than NN-A, because
defensive distillation is more robust to the saliency map
based evasion attacks [44]. LRA-A is more robust to the
noise added by AttriGuard, i.e., the inference accuracy
of LRA-A decreases the slowest as the utility-loss bud-
get increases and LRA-A has higher inference accuracies
than other attacks except RF-A when the utility-loss bud-
get is larger than 3. However, AttriGuard is still effec-
tive against LRA-A since LRA-A still has low inference
accuracies and approaches to the baseline attack as the
utility-loss budget increases.
Impact of the target probability distribution: Fig-
ure 5 compares the performance of the two target proba-
bility distributions. We observe that the target probabil-
ity distribution pt outperforms pu, especially when the
utility-loss budget is relatively large. Specifically, the at-
tacker’s inference accuracy is smaller when the defender
uses pt . This is because pt considers the attribute in-
formation in the training dataset, while pu assumes no
knowledge about attributes. Specifically, according to
our solution in Equation 8, the defender adds the noise ri
with a probability that is the corresponding target prob-
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Figure 6: Impact of the defender’s classifier. The at-
tack is NN-A.
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Figure 7: Impact of the overlap between the training
datasets used by the attacker and the defender.
ability normalized by the magnitude of ri. Suppose the
defender’s classifier predicts city j for a user, where j
is likely to be the true attribute value of the user since
the defender’s classifier is relatively accurate. The noise
r j is 0. Roughly speaking, if the defender adds 0 noise,
then the attacker is likely to infer the true attribute value.
For the users whose true attribute values are rare (i.e.,
small fraction of users have these attribute values), the
defender is less likely to add 0 noise when using pt than
using pu. As a result, the attacker has a lower inference
accuracy when pt is used.
Impact of the defender’s classifier: Figure 6 shows
the attacker’s inference accuracy when the defender uses
different classifiers, where the attack is NN-A. We ob-
serve that when the defender chooses the NN-D classi-
fier, the attacker’s inference accuracy is lower with the
same utility-loss budget. One reason is that the noise
found in Phase I is more likely to transfer between clas-
sifiers in the same category. Specifically, the noise op-
timized based on the neural network classifier NN-D is
more likely to transfer to the neural network classifier
NN-A than the logistic regression classifier LR-A.
Impact of different training datasets: In practice,
the attacker and the defender may use different train-
ing datasets to train their classifiers. We randomly and
evenly split the training dataset into two folds with α%
overlap, where α% ranges from 0% to 100%. We con-
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Figure 8: Impact of different noise-type-policies.
sider the attack NN-A and use one fold to train the classi-
fier, while we consider the defender’s classifier is LR-D
and use the other fold to train it. We set the utility-loss
budget to be 4, which reduces most attacks to be close to
the baseline attack. Figure 7 shows the attacker’s infer-
ence accuracy as a function of the overlap α%. We find
that the differences between the training datasets used by
the attacker and the defender have impact on the effec-
tiveness of AttriGuard, but the impact is small. Specifi-
cally, when the defender and the attacker use the same
training dataset to learn their classifiers, the attacker’s
inference accuracy is around 0.10. The attacker’s infer-
ence accuracy increases when the overlap between the
training datasets decreases, but the attacker’s inference
accuracy is still less than 0.15 even if there are no over-
laps. The reason is that both the attacker’s classifier and
the defender’s classifier model the relationships between
public data and attributes. Once both of their (different)
training datasets are representative, the noise optimized
based on the defender’s classifier is very likely to transfer
to the attacker’s classifier.
Impact of different noise-type-policies: Figure 8 com-
pares the three noise-type-policies. Modify Add outper-
forms Add New, which outperforms Modify Exist. This
is because Modify Add is the most flexible policy, al-
lowing AttriGuard to modify existing rating scores or
add new rating scores. A user often reviews a very
small fraction of apps (e.g., 0.23% of apps on average
in our dataset), so Add New is more flexible than Mod-
ify Exist, making Add New outperform Modify Exist.
Comparing AttriGuard with existing defense meth-
ods: Figure 9 compares AttriGuard with existing de-
fense methods developed by different research commu-
nities: BlurMe [9], ChiSquare [18], Quantization Prob-
abilistic Mapping (QPM) [19], and Local Differential
Privacy-Succinct Histogram (LDP-SH) [36]. BlurMe
and ChiSquare select the apps based on their correlations
with the attribute values (i.e., cities in our case) that do
not belong to the user and change the rating scores for
the selected apps. QPM is an approximate solution to a
game-theoretic formulation. We quantize public data to
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Figure 9: Comparing AttriGuard with existing de-
fense methods.
200 clusters in QPM. LDP-SH is a local differential pri-
vacy method for categorical data. In our case, each entry
of x can be viewed as categorical data taking values 0,
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, or 1.0. We apply LDP-SH to each en-
try of x. We didn’t use other LDP methods [35, 40] be-
cause they do not preserve the semantics of rating scores.
For instance, to obfuscate a user’s rating score to an app,
RAPPOR [35] might generate several rating scores for
the app for the user, which is unrealistic. All the com-
pared methods except LDP-SH use the same training
dataset, while LDP-SH does not need training dataset.
We note that BlurMe and ChiSquare require the defender
to know users’ true private attribute values.
Each compared method has a parameter to control
privacy-utility tradeoffs. For a method and a given pa-
rameter value, the method adds noise to users’ public
data, and we can obtain a pair (utility loss, inference ac-
curacy), where the utility loss and inference accuracy are
averaged over all test users. Therefore, for each method,
via setting a list of different parameter values, we obtain
a list of pairs (utility loss, inference accuracy). Then, we
plot these pairs as a utility loss vs. inference accuracy
curve. Figure 9 shows the curve for each method.
Our AttriGuard outperforms all compared defense
methods. Specifically, to achieve the same inference
accuracy, AttriGuard adds substantially smaller noise
to public data. AttriGuard outperforms BlurMe and
ChiSquare because they add noise to entries of x that are
selected based on heuristics, while AttriGuard adds min-
imum noise via solving optimization problems. We ex-
plored a large range of the parameter to control privacy-
utility tradeoffs for QPM, but QPM cannot reach to the
low utility-loss region, i.e., we only observe a short
curve for QPM in Figure 9. This is because quantization
changes public data substantially, which is equivalent to
adding large noise. AttriGuard outperforms LDP-SH be-
cause LDP-SH aims to achieve a privacy goal that is dif-
ferent from defending against attribute inference attacks.
Utility loss for recommender systems: We evaluate
the utility loss of the public data when they are used
for recommender systems. For each user in the train-
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Figure 10: Relative recommendation precision loss
vs. top-N recommendations.
ing and testing datasets, we randomly sample 5 of its
rated apps to test a recommender system. We use a
standard matrix factorization based recommender sys-
tem to recommend top-N items for each user. We im-
plemented the recommender system using the code from
http://surpriselib.com/. We measure the performance of
the recommender system using a standard metric, i.e.,
recommendation precision. For each user, the recom-
mendation precision is the fraction of its recommended
top-N items that are among the sampled 5 rated apps.
The recommendation precision for the entire recom-
mender system is the recommendation precision aver-
aged over all users.
For each compared defense method, we use the de-
fense method to add noise to the testing users, where
the noise level is selected such that an attacker’s infer-
ence accuracy is close to 0.1 (using the results in Fig-
ure 9). Then, for each compared defense method, we
compute the relative recommendation precision loss de-
fined as |Pre1−Pre2|Pre1 , where Pre1 and Pre2 are the recom-
mendation precisions before and after adding noise, re-
spectively. Figure 10 shows the relative recommendation
precision loss as a function of N for the compared meth-
ods. We observe AttriGuard outperforms the compared
methods. Moreover, our results indicate that L0 norm of
the noise is a reasonable utility-loss metric for recom-
mender systems, as a method with larger L0-norm noise
also has larger relative recommendation precision loss.
One exception is the comparison between BlueMe and
ChiSquare: ChiSquare adds noise with larger L0 norm
but has lower relative recommendation precision loss.
This means that ChiSquare adds noise that is more sim-
ilar to a user’s public data and thus has less impact on a
user’s profile of preferences.
6 Discussions and Limitations
Approximating the game-theoretic optimization
problems: One natural direction is to find approximate
solutions to the intractable game-theoretic optimization
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problems. Our experiments demonstrated that the
existing approximate solution called QPM [19] incurs
larger utility loss than our AttriGuard. We note that we
could apply the idea of AttriGuard to approximate the
game-theoretic optimization problem in Equation 19
in Appendix A. However, such approximation is not
meaningful. Specifically, AttriGuard essentially finds
the noise mechanism for a given user (i.e., x is fixed)
and treats the mechanism as a probability distribution
over the representative noise. However, if we fix x and
assume the probabilistic mapping to be a probability
distribution over the representative noise in Equation 19,
then the objective function in the optimization problem
becomes a constant. In other words, any probabilistic
mapping that satisfies the utility-loss budget is an
approximate solution, which is not meaningful. We
believe it is an interesting future work to study better ap-
proximate solutions to the game-theoretic optimization
problems, e.g., the one in Equation 19 in Appendix A.
Detecting noise: An attacker could first detect the noise
added by AttriGuard and then perform attribute inference
attacks. In our experiments, we tried a low-rank approx-
imation based method to detect noise and AttriGuard is
still effective against the method. However, we acknowl-
edge that this does not mean an attacker cannot perform
better attacks via detecting the noise. We believe it is an
interesting future work to systematically study the pos-
sibility of detecting noise both theoretically and empir-
ically. We note that detecting noise in our problem is
different from detecting adversarial examples [47–51]
in adversarial machine learning, because detecting ad-
versarial examples is to detect whether a given example
has attacker-added noise or not. However, detecting ad-
versarial examples may be able to help perform better
attribute inference attacks. Specifically, if an attacker de-
tects that a public data vector is an adversarial example,
the attacker can use a defense-aware attribute inference
attack for the public data vector, otherwise the attacker
can use a defense-unaware attack.
Interacting with adversarial machine learning: An
attacker could use robust classifiers, which are harder
to evade, to infer user attributes. In our experiments,
we evaluated three robust classifiers: adversarial train-
ing, defensive distillation, and region-based classifica-
tion. However, our defense is still effective for attacks
using such robust classifiers. As the adversarial machine
learning community develops more robust classifiers, an
attacker could leverage them to infer attributes. How-
ever, we speculate that robust classifiers could always
be evaded with large enough noise. In other words, we
could still leverage evasion attacks to defend against at-
tribute inference attacks, but we may need larger noise
(thus larger utility loss) when the attacker uses a robust
classifier that is harder to evade.
Multiple attributes: When users have multiple at-
tributes, an attacker could leverage the correlations be-
tween attributes to perform better attribute inference at-
tacks. The defender can design the target probability dis-
tribution based on the joint probability distribution of at-
tributes to protect users against such attacks.
Dynamic public data: In this work, we focus on one-
time release of the public data. It would be interesting to
extend our framework to dynamic public data. For dy-
namic public data, an attacker could learn more informa-
tion and perform better attribute inference attacks when
observing historical public data.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we propose a practical two-phase frame-
work called AttriGuard to defend against attribute infer-
ence attacks. In Phase I, AttriGuard finds a minimum
noise for each attribute value via an evasion attack that
we optimize to incorporate the unique characteristics of
privacy protection. In Phase II, AttriGuard randomly se-
lects one of the noise found in Phase I to mislead the
attacker’s inference. Our empirical results on a real-
world dataset demonstrate that 1) we can defend against
attribute inference attacks with a small utility loss, 2) ad-
versarial machine learning can play an important role at
privacy protection, and 3) our defense significantly out-
performs existing defenses.
Interesting directions for future work include 1) study-
ing the possibility of detecting the added noise both the-
oretically and empirically, 2) designing better approxi-
mate solutions to the game-theoretic optimization prob-
lems, and 3) generalizing AttriGuard to dynamic and
non-relational public data, e.g., social graphs.
Acknowledgements: We thank the anonymous review-
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A Game-Theoretic Formulation
Shokri et al. [13] proposed a game-theoretic formulation
for defending against location inference attacks. In lo-
cation inference attacks, both the public data and private
attribute are users’ true locations. Specifically, a user’s
true public data is the user’s true location; the defender
obfuscates the true location to a fake location; and the
attacker aims to infer the user’s true location, which can
also be viewed as the user’s private attribute. The game-
theoretic formulation defends against the optimal loca-
tion inference attack that adapts based on the knowledge
of the defense. We extend this game-theoretic formula-
tion for attribute inference attacks. In attribute inference
attacks, public data and private attributes are different.
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A.1 Notations
We denote by s and x the private attribute and public data,
respectively. We denote by Pr(s,x) the joint probability
distribution of s and x. The defender aims to find a proba-
bilistic mapping f , which obfuscates a true public data x
to a noisy public data x′ with a probability f (x′|x). The
probabilistic mapping f is essentially a matrix, whose
number of rows and number of columns is the domain
size of the public data vector x.
A.2 Privacy Loss
Suppose a user’s true private attribute value is s and an
attacker infers the user’s private attribute value to be sˆ.
We denote the privacy loss for the user as a certain metric
dp(s, sˆ). For example, one choice for the privacy loss
metric could be:
dp(s, sˆ) =
{
1 if s = sˆ
0 otherwise,
(11)
which means that the privacy loss is 1 if the attacker cor-
rectly infers the user’s attribute value, and 0 otherwise.
A.3 Utility Loss
For a true public data vector x and its corresponding
noisy vector x′, we define the utility loss as dq(x,x′),
which could be any distance metric over x and x′. For
instance, dq(x,x′) could be the L0 norm of the noise
||x′− x||0, which is the number of entries of x that are
modified. Given the marginal probability distribution
Pr(x) and the probabilistic mapping f , we have the ex-
pected utility loss as follows:
L =∑
x,x′
Pr(x) f (x′|x)dq(x′,x). (12)
A.4 Defender’s Strategy
The defender aims to construct a probabilistic mapping f
to defend against the optimal inference attack subject to a
utility-loss budget β . The attacker knows the joint prob-
ability distribution Pr(s,x) and the probabilistic mapping
f . After observing a noisy public data vector x′, the at-
tacker can compute a posterior probability distribution of
the private attribute s as follows:
Pr(s|x′) = Pr(s,x
′)
Pr(x′)
(13)
=
∑x Pr(s,x) f (x′|x)
Pr(x′)
(14)
Suppose the attacker infers the private attribute to be
sˆ. Then, the conditional expected privacy loss is
∑s Pr(s|x′)dp(s, sˆ). Therefore, the maximum conditional
expected privacy loss is as follows:
max
sˆ
∑
s
Pr(s|x′)dp(s, sˆ) (15)
Considering the probability distribution of x′, we have
the unconditional expected privacy loss as follows:
∑
x′
Pr(x′)max
sˆ
∑
s
Pr(s|x′)dp(s, sˆ)
=∑
x′
max
sˆ
∑
s
∑
x
Pr(s,x) f (x′|x)dp(s, sˆ). (16)
We define yx′ = maxsˆ∑s∑x Pr(s,x) f (x′|x)dp(s, sˆ). The
defender’s goal is to minimize the unconditional ex-
pected privacy loss subject to a utility-loss budget. For-
mally, the defender aims to solve the following optimiza-
tion problem:
min∑
x′
yx′ (17)
subject to L≤ β . (18)
According to Shokri et al. [13], this optimization prob-
lem can be transformed to the following linear program-
ming problem:
min∑
x′
yx′
subject to L≤ β
yx′ ≥∑
s
∑
x
Pr(s,x) f (x′|x)dp(s, sˆ),∀x′, sˆ
∑
x′
f (x′|x) = 1,∀x
f (x′|x)≥ 0,∀x,x′ (19)
A.5 Limitations
The formulated optimization problem is computation-
ally intractable for attribute inference attacks in practice.
Specifically, the computation cost is exponential to the
dimensionality of the public data vector, which is often
high in practice. For instance, in recommender systems,
a public data vector consists of a user’s rating scores
to the items that the user rated and 0 for the items that
the user did not rate. Suppose a recommender system
has 100 items (this is a very small recommender sys-
tem in practice) and a rating score can be 1, 2, 3, 4, or
5. Then, the domain size of the public data vector x is
6100 and the size of the probabilistic mapping matrix f
is 6100×6100 = 6200. Therefore, even in the context of a
very small recommender system with 100 items, it is in-
tractable to solve the formulated optimization problem.
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